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Abstract
Objective—To examine the impact of different bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) 
supplemental immunization activity (SIA) strategies on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 
poliovirus transmission and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) risks before and after 
globally-coordinated cessation of serotype 1 and 3 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV13 cessation).
Methods—We adapt mathematical models that previously informed vaccine choices ahead of the 
trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine to bOPV switch to estimate the population immunity to serotype 1 
and 3 poliovirus transmission needed at the time of OPV13 cessation to prevent subsequent 
cVDPV outbreaks. We then examine the impact of different frequencies of SIAs using bOPV in 
high risk populations on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission, on the risk of 
serotype 1 and 3 cVDPV outbreaks, and on the vulnerability to any imported bOPV-related 
polioviruses.
Results—Maintaining high population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission using bOPV 
SIAs significantly reduces 1) the risk of outbreaks due to imported serotype 1 and 3 viruses, 2) the 
emergence of indigenous cVDPVs before or after OPV13 cessation, and 3) the vulnerability to 
bOPV-related polioviruses in the event of non-synchronous OPV13 cessation or inadvertent bOPV 
use after OPV13 cessation.
Conclusion—Although some reduction in global SIA frequency can safely occur, countries with 
suboptimal routine immunization coverage should each continue to conduct at least one annual 
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SIA with bOPV, preferably more, until global OPV13 cessation. Preventing cVDPV risks after 
OPV13 cessation requires investments in bOPV SIAs now through the time of OPV13 cessation.
Keywords
Polio; Eradication; Risk management; OPV; Vaccine choice
Introduction
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria remain the only three countries with continued 
indigenous transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) serotype 1 (WPV1). The last reported 
case associated with naturally-occurring serotype 2 WPV (WPV2) occurred in 1999 [1], 
with certification of its global eradication in 2015 [2]. The last reported case associated with 
serotype 3 WPV (WPV3) occurred in 2012 [3], Oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation 
represents an essential part of the polio endgame because of the risks of paralytic 
poliomyelitis disease (polio) associated with continued use of the vaccine [4]. These risks 
include vaccine-associated paralytic polio in recipients and close contacts; the acquisition of 
WPV-like properties by OPV-related viruses as they continue to circulate in vulnerable 
populations (i.e., circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs)); and long-term 
infections in rare individuals with B-cell related primary immunodeficiency diseases (i.e., 
immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs)) [4,5]. Between mid-
April and early May 2016, 155 countries successfully coordinated the global switch from 
OPV containing attenuated strains of all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e. trivalent OPV 
(tOPV)), to bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing only serotypes 1 and 3 [6]. With the switch, 
the global cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2) became a reality, and, if 
successful, will pave the way for the eventual cessation of the remaining two serotypes [7]. 
The current plan calls for simultaneous cessation of the remaining OPV serotypes (OPV13 
cessation) [7], although additional delays in achieving WPV1 eradication could motivate 
earlier certification of WPV3 eradication and a switch from bOPV to monovalent OPV 
(mOPV) serotype 1 [8,9].
Due to the limited intestinal immunity provided by the inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) 
[10–13], the addition of IPV to routine immunization (RI) schedules does not provide much 
reduction in cVDPV risks in populations at highest risk of such outbreaks [14–16]. However, 
IPV provides the only source of individual immunity to polio (disease) after OPV cessation 
and over time provides populations with more protection from poliovirus transmission 
compared to no IPV. Populations in which conditions favor a greater contribution of 
oropharyngeal transmission of poliovirus compared to fecal-oral transmission (i.e., better 
hygiene and sanitation and more temperate climates) coincide with settings with higher 
expected prevalence of long-term iVDPV excretors [17]. In those populations, IPV provides 
more protection from poliovirus transmission because IPV provides better protection from 
oropharyngeal excretion compared to fecal excretion [12,18].
In the context of preparing for the tOPV to bOPV switch, several mathematical modeling 
analyses demonstrated the need to intensify tOPV use prior to the switch to maximize 
population immunity to transmission (i.e., the aggregated ability of all individuals in a 
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population to contribute to poliovirus transmission, including from individuals immune to 
polio (disease) that may participate in transmission asymptomatically [19]) for serotype 2. 
Doing so will minimize the risk of 1) continued circulation of indigenous serotype 2 cVDPV 
(cVDPV2) outbreaks that began before the switch [14,20,21], 2) continued transmission and 
evolution of OPV2-related viruses after the switch [14, 20], 3) cVDPV2 outbreaks due to 
importation of OPV2-related poliovirus into countries that already switched from countries 
yet to switch in the event of a non-synchronous switch [22], and 4) cVDPV2 outbreaks 
following inadvertent tOPV [23] or deliberate serotype 2 mOPV use after the switch [24].
With the tOPV intensification that preceded the now completed switch, WPV1 confined to 
three countries, and IPV introduced in all countries that experienced WPV or cVDPV 
outbreaks since 2000, questions emerge regarding the need to continue to conduct frequent 
supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with bOPV in polio non-endemic countries to 
maintain high population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission. This analysis uses the 
poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution models [25,26] previously used to inform risk 
management of the tOPV to bOPV switch [14,20,22,23] to investigate the impact of various 
levels of bOPV use on the risk of indigenous cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks before or 
after OPV13 cessation and on the time after OPV13 cessation until populations become 
vulnerable to transmission of OPV-related virus strains with different degrees of reversion. 
We further compare and discuss strategies that focus on continued bOPV maintenance 
versus bOPV intensification only shortly before OPV13 cessation.
Methods
We previously developed and extensively tested a deterministic differential equation-based 
poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model (i.e., the DEB model) (see appendix A1 
available at: http://www.kidrisk.org for details) [25–27]. The compartmental model divides a 
population by age groups and for each of the three serotypes by 8 immunity states, 5 waning 
stages (for individuals with actively acquired immunity through IPV vaccination or live 
poliovirus infection), and 6 fecal and 6 oropharyngeal infection stages (for individuals 
infected with a live poliovirus) subdivided into 20 OPV reversion stages (for infections 
tracing back to reversion stages (for infections tracing back to). The choice of age groups 
varies by modeled population (e.g., to accommodate different RI schedules), although for all 
populations we assume preferential mixing within the three mixing age groups of 0–4 year 
olds, 5–14 year olds, and those age 15 years or older. The basic reproduction number (R0) 
characterizes the inherent ability of a poliovirus to spread in a given population [28]. We 
assume fixed relative R0 values between the three WPV serotypes (i.e., 1:0.9:0.75 for 
WPV1:WPV2:WPV3) and use the WPV1 R0 as an overall indicator of conditions that affect 
poliovirus transmissibility in a population (e.g., crowding, hygiene, sanitations, climate), 
which typically varies over time due to seasonality.
The subdivision by reversion stage provides an approximation of the process by which the 
attenuated polioviruses found in OPV evolve into VDPVs, characterized by serotype-
specific average times to reach the last reversion stage (i.e., 408 days for serotype 2 and 621 
days for serotype 1 and 3). The last reversion stage represents fully-reverted vaccine-derived 
poliovirus with the same assumed R0 and paralysis-to-infection ratio as homotypic WPVs. 
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The starting relative R0 values (i.e., 0.37 for OPV1, 0.55 for OPV2 and 0.25 for OPV3) and 
paralysis-to-infection ratios compared to homotypic WPV also vary by serotype, with the R0 
and natural logarithm of the paralysis-to-infection ratio both increasing linearly by reversion 
stage (see appendix A1). The OPV evolution process simulates die-out of poliovirus 
transmission of any serotype and reversion stage (i.e., strain) in the (deterministic) DEB 
model once the prevalence of a given strain drops below the transmission threshold value of 
5 per million people in any given mixing age group. If this occurs, we set the corresponding 
force-of-infection to zero in the simulation, such that no new infections occur for the 
serotype and reversion stage. Conversely, viruses only begin to circulate at a given reversion 
stage once the prevalence exceeds the transmission threshold after sufficient inflow from 
lower reversion stages. The OPV evolution process in the model adequately reproduced 
secondary OPV transmission and the occurrence or absence of cVDPV outbreaks in a 
diverse set of populations [12,25,29,30], We observe cVDPV emergences in the DEB model 
(i.e. defined as the occurrence of prevalence of virus in the last reversion stage above the 
transmission threshold) only when OPV-related viruses circulate in a population with low 
enough population immunity to sustain transmission [15,16,20], consistent with the evidence 
from cVDPV outbreaks [31–33].
We characterize population immunity to transmission in the model using the mixing-
adjusted effective immune proportion (EIPM), which aggregates the relative potential to 
participate in transmission of all individuals compared to fully susceptible individuals and 
also takes into account the mixing structure between different age groups and any 
preferentially mixing subpopulations [16]. An EIPM of 0 indicates that all individuals in a 
given population are completely susceptible to transmission, and higher values indicate 
higher effective proportions of the population with immunity that provides protection from 
reinfection and/or poliovirus excretion. Although we assume full immunity from polio 
(disease) for all successfully vaccinated or previously infected individuals, these immune 
individuals may still participate asymptomatically in transmission to varying degrees. The 
EIPM relates closely to the net reproduction number (Rn, equal to [1-EIPM] × R0), which 
represents the average number of secondary infections generated by a new infection given 
the existing population immunity to transmission. Given that Rn depends directly on R0, a 
given EIPM implies different Rn values for strains with different R0 values. Transmission of 
a given strain will eventually die out if its Rn remains less than 1. Therefore, in the context 
of absence of any indigenous poliovirus circulation, we use the occurrence of an Rn greater 
than 1 for a given strain as an indicator of vulnerability of a given population to circulation 
of that strain if that strain were imported into that population. The corresponding threshold 
effective immune proportion (i.e., EIP*=1-1/R0) differs by strain because it depends on R0 
(i.e., a strain with a higher R0 can circulate at a higher EIPM). Our analysis focuses on 
characterizing the vulnerability of populations to potential importations as a result of 
different bOPV strategies, but does not model actual importations or their consequences, 
which represent random events that could alter vulnerability going forward in the event of 
widespread circulation and/or outbreak response immunization.
Table 1 shows the population-specific inputs for a hypothetical population (i.e., high R0, no 
seasonality) as well as three populations based on the populations of northern India, northern 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and northern Nigeria that we previously considered for analyses 
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of the risks associated with potential non-synchronous OPV2 cessation [22], or inadvertent 
tOPV use after OPV2 cessation [23]. The populations like northern India, northern Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, and northern Nigeria represent selections from a larger global long-term 
poliovirus risk management model [34]. The properties include those related to inherent 
transmissibility of polioviruses (i.e., WPV R0 and seasonality, role of oropharyngeal 
transmission), RI coverage, SIA impact (i.e., true coverage and repeated missed probability, 
defined as the “conditional probability that a targeted individual does not receive a dose in a 
round, given that the individual did not receive a dose in the previous round despite falling 
into the targeted population for that round” [26]), and surveillance (not used in this paper 
because we did not consider outbreak response). All populations assume the same generic 
DEB model inputs [25,26] and simplified vaccination histories, including IPV 
administration with the third non-birth OPV dose from January 1, 2015 [34] and tOPV 
intensification ahead of the tOPV to bOPV switch on May 1, 2016. They further assume 
administration of a birth dose of OPV with 50% of the coverage achieved with 3 non-birth 
RI doses (POL3); that 20% of children who do not receive at least 3 non-birth RI doses (i.e., 
100%-POL3) receive 1 dose; and that another 20% of children who do not receive at least 3 
non-birth RI doses receive 2 doses, based on typical values for low- and lower middle-
income countries [25,34,35]. We also consider a hypothetical population with a WPV1 R0 of 
13 and no seasonality to control for any seasonality-associated behavior, and which 
otherwise assumes the same properties as the under-vaccinated northern Indian population.
For both the hypothetical and realistic populations, the first analysis uses the DEB model to 
determine the relationship between RI coverage and population immunity and the 
occurrence of indigenous cVDPV outbreaks before or after OPV13 cessation for serotypes 1 
and 3. For this analysis, we assume no SIAs for long enough (i.e., 9 years) prior to OPV13 
cessation to achieve approximately constant population immunity at the time of OPV13 
cessation. This analysis follows the same approach as a prior analysis of the relationship 
between RI coverage with tOPV and cVDPV2 risks after OPV2 cessation [20]. However, the 
assumptions of this analysis differ from that of the prior analysis (even for serotype 2 
polioviruses) because of the inclusion of the birth OPV dose, partial coverage with 1 or 2 
OPV doses, and the introduction of IPV in 2015.
We use the same hypothetical population to illustrate the impact of the annual number of 
bOPV SIAs on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission over time and on 
OPV13 cessation dynamics. This analysis quantifies the impact of the annual number of 
bOPV SIAs on die-out of OPV-related viruses after OPV13 cessation and on the 
vulnerability to different serotype 1 and 3 strains for the realistic northern India, northern 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and northern Nigeria modeled populations. To control for the 
timing of the last bOPV SIA before OPV13 cessation and to ensure that all bOPV SIAs 
occur before OPV13 cessation, this analysis assumes 4 annual bOPV SIAs that occur on 
days 0, 40, 80, and 120 of each year, 3 annual bOPV SIAs that occur on days 40, 80, and 
120, 2 annual SIAs on days 80 and 120, 1 annual SIA on day 120, or no SIAs.
In an additional analysis to explore the role of IPV, we repeated the above runs but without 
any IPV use in RI and compared this to the results with IPV in RI from 2015 on. Finally, we 
model the realistic populations to explore the population immunity and indigenous cVDPV 
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risk implications of maintaining bOPV SIAs up until the time of OPV13 cessation versus no 
bOPV SIAs during 2017–2019 followed by bOPV intensification in early 2020 shortly 
before OPV13 cessation. All analyses assume OPV13 cessation on May 1, 2020 and exclude 
any immunization response to cVDPV outbreaks.
Results
Figure 1a shows that for the modeled hypothetical population without seasonality, no 
indigenous cVDPV1 or cVDPV3 outbreaks occur before or after OPV13 cessation when RI 
coverage exceeds 65%. The results shown in Figure 1a also indicate the significant drop in 
population immunity to transmission following successfully coordinated OPV13 cessation in 
this hypothetical population. The EIP* needed to prevent cVDPV circulation differs by 
serotype because we assume that the R0 values of WPVs and fully reverted VDPVs vary by 
serotype [25,26]. Despite the same bOPV take rate (i.e., the proportion of vaccine recipients 
that develops an immune response) for serotypes 1 and 3 (Table 1), we find higher EIPM for 
serotype 1 than serotype 3 due to the greater secondary spread for serotype 1 as a result of 
the higher assumed R0 values for viruses closely related to OPV1 compared to viruses 
closely related to OPV3. In this model of a hypothetical population, highly-reverted 
polioviruses do not already circulate at the time of OPV13 cessation due to sufficient 
population immunity to prevent extensive circulation and evolution of lower reversion stage 
viruses, which die out after OPV13 cessation. Therefore, successful OPV13 cessation for 
both serotypes can occur even with population immunity to transmission below the 
respective EIP*. However, any further decrease in bOPV coverage and resulting decrease in 
population immunity to transmission allows continued circulation and evolution of the 
existing OPV1-related viruses after OPV13 cessation, which results in a cVDPV1 outbreak 
in the hypothetical population shown by the increasing EIPM in the second year after 
OPV13 cessation in Figure 1b. However, for the same RI coverage no cVDPV3 outbreak 
occurs because of the low transmissibility of viruses closely related to OPV3. We find that 
for RI coverage of 46%, no cVDPV3 outbreak occurs (Figure 1c) even though for such low 
coverage a cVDPV1 outbreak would occur 5 years before OPV13 cessation in the 
hypothetical population (leading the EIPM to oscillate around the threshold at the time of 
OPV cessation in the absence of an outbreak response, as shown Figure 1c). RI coverage 
below 46% results in both an indigenous cVDPV3 outbreak after OPV13 cessation and an 
indigenous cVDPV1 outbreak well before OPV13 cessation (Figure 1d).
Comparing the minimum population immunity to poliovirus transmission to prevent a 
cVDPV after OPV cessation of each serotype in the hypothetical population, and using 
separate model runs for each serotype with different coverage levels, Figure 2 shows that 
preventing cVDPV2 outbreaks after OPV2 cessation in the hypothetical population requires 
the highest population immunity to transmission. This remains consistent with the known 
rapid reversion and high transmissibility of the attenuated serotype 2 poliovirus in OPV 
[32,36,37] and the corresponding model assumptions of short reversion times and high 
relative R0 values for serotype 2. Preventing a cVDPV1 outbreak after OPV1 cessation 
requires somewhat lower population immunity to transmission than preventing a cVDPV2 
outbreak after OPV2 cessation. Preventing a cVDPV3 outbreak after OPV3 cessation 
requires even lower population immunity to transmission. The arrows in Figure 2 show that 
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for serotype 2, population immunity to transmission at OPV2 cessation must remain at its 
threshold of approximately 0.91 in this hypothetical population model to prevent a 
subsequent cVDPV2 outbreak, while it can remain somewhat lower than the threshold for 
serotype 1 and even lower for serotype 3 without subsequent cVDPV1 and cVPDV3 
outbreaks. However, with respect to the minimum RI coverage needed to prevent cVDPV 
outbreaks after OPV cessation, we find that successful serotype 1 cessation requires the 
highest RI coverage, followed by serotype 2 cessation and serotype 3 cessation (see Figure 2 
legend for RI coverage values). The need for relatively higher RI coverage for successful 
serotype 1 compared to serotype 2 cessation relates primarily to greater secondary exposure 
to serotype 2 than serotype 1 OPV-related viruses that provides or boosts immunity of 
individuals who come into contact with OPV recipients [36,37].
While Figures 1 and 2 considered the effect of RI only in the hypothetical population, Figure 
3 shows the population immunity to transmission and OPV13 cessation dynamics as a 
function of the annual number of bOPV SIAs in the hypothetical population with a WPV1 
R0 of 13. This clearly demonstrates the need to continue some level of bOPV SIAs to 
prevent indigenous cVDPV outbreaks in this type of population. Figure 3 shows that in the 
absence of bOPV SIAs, cVDPV outbreaks occur before OPV13 cessation for serotype 1 
(Figure 3a) and after OPV13 cessation for serotype 3 (Figure 3b). With at least one annual 
bOPV SIA, Rn values of fully-reverted VDPV and WPV oscillate around or over 1, which 
remains sufficient to prevent indigenous cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 emergence, but which 
implies the possibility of widespread circulation in the event of an importation of WPV1, 
cVDPV1, or cVDPV3 from another population. Due to the lower R0 of WPV3 compared to 
WPV1 (i.e., WPV3 R0=0.75 × WPV1 R0), the same bOPV frequency leads to somewhat 
lower Rn values for serotype 3 compared to serotype 1 despite the lower secondary spread of 
OPV3-related viruses compared to OPV1-related viruses.
Table 2 shows how the bOPV SIA frequency affects die-out of OPV1-and OPV3-related 
viruses after OPV13 cessation for all modeled populations. A consistent pattern emerges of 
longer times after OPV13 cessation until OPV-related viruses die out for lower bOPV SIA 
frequencies. Lowering the bOPV SIA frequency first results in an indigenous cVDPV1 
outbreak after OPV13 cessation and eventually can lead to a cVDPV1 outbreak before 
OPV13 cessation and a cVDPV3 outbreak after OPV13 cessation. The frequency with 
which this occurs depends on the characteristics of the population, including the R0 value for 
the population and the RI coverage level (Table 1). For populations with lower R0 values 
(e.g., like northern Nigeria), low RI coverage may sustain sufficient population immunity to 
prevent indigenous cVDPV outbreaks, particularly for serotype 3 due the low 
transmissibility of viruses closely related to OPV3.
Based on the same model runs as Table 2 and Table 3 show how long it takes before the 
different populations become vulnerable to transmission of any imported OPV1- and OPV3-
related viruses (i.e., attain an Rn>1) after OPV13 cessation (e.g., due to non-synchronous 
OPV13 cessation or inadvertent bOPV use [22,23]) as a function of bOPV SIA frequency. 
Table 3 shows that higher bOPV SIA frequency consistently implies more time until the first 
countries become vulnerable to different OPV1- and OPV3-related strains. However, for the 
parent OPV1 and OPV3 strains (stage 0), the time until countries become vulnerable 
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remains at least two years, at which point the effect of bOPV SIA frequency before OPV13 
cessation becomes small. For stage 10 OPV1- and OPV3-related viruses, which may 
circulate in a population that still uses OPV and then enter another population through an 
importation [22], Table 3 shows a greater effect of bOPV SIA frequency, with one annual 
bOPV SIA in some cases leading to a difference of over a year until vulnerability (e.g., 
northern Nigeria general population, between 1, 2 annual bOPV SIAs). For cVDPV1 and 
cVDPV3 (assumed to behave the same as WPV1 and WPV3, respectively), we find an even 
greater effect of the number of bOPV SIAs. For these results, zeroes indicate that for the 
given bOPV frequency the population immunity to transmission has already become so low 
that the population can support transmission of an imported cVDPV1 or cVDPV3 before 
OPV13 cessation.
In an additional analysis of the role of IPV, we found that failure to introduce IPV increased 
vulnerability, particularly to lower reversion stage viruses for which vulnerability only 
occurs long after OPV13 cessation (see appendix A2). Moreover, failure to introduce IPV 
resulted in longer times until die-out of OPV1- and OPV3-related viruses. For two 
combinations of populations and bOPV frequencies (i.e., northern Pakistan and Afghanistan 
general population with 0 annual bOPV SIAs and northern Pakistan and Afghanistan under-
vaccinated subpopulation with 3 annual bOPV SIAs), not using IPV resulted in an 
indigenous cVDPV1 outbreak that would not occur with IPV introduced in 2015. This 
reflects a greater cumulative effect of IPV on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 
transmission between IPV introduction in 2015 and OPV13 cessation in 2020 compared to 
the previously estimated very limited effect of IPV use between IPV introduction in 2015 
and OPV2 cessation in 2016 [14].
Table 4 compares a strategy of bOPV intensification in 2020 (i.e., between 1 and 4 bOPV 
SIAs in 2020 prior to OPV13 cessation without maintenance of bOPV SIAs between 2017 
and 2019) with a strategy of annual maintenance using one or three annual bOPV SIAs. 
Intensification with bOPV prevents indigenous cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks after 
OPV13 cessation in the three general populations in Table 4, regardless of the number of 
intensification SIAs, but in all three under-vaccinated subpopulations indigenous cVDPV1 
outbreaks already occur before OPV13 cessation. Moreover, bOPV intensification results in 
substantially greater proportions of the three-year period 2017–2019 during which the Rn 
values for cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 remain greater than 1, which implies greater vulnerability 
to imported cVDPVs or WPVs. In the under-vaccinated subpopulations, high proportions 
with Rn >1 occur even with bOPV maintenance due to the low impact and high repeated 
missed probabilities of SIAs (Table 1), but bOPV intensification implies significantly greater 
vulnerability overall during 2017–2019. For example, in the under-vaccinated subpopulation 
in northern Nigeria, the average Rn for cVDPV3 during 2017–2019 equals 1.14 with 3 
annual bOPV SIAs, 1.26 with 1 annual bOPV SIA, and 1.36 without bOPV maintenance.
Discussion
As in the case of coordinated global OPV2 cessation, the best time to manage the risks of 
post-OPV13 cessation cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks is between now and the time of 
OPV13 cessation. Preventing cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks before and after coordinated 
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OPV13 cessation requires maintaining sufficiently high population immunity to 
transmission to stop OPV-related viruses introduced before OPV13 cessation from 
establishing chains of transmission and evolving to cVDPVs. Maintaining high population 
immunity to poliovirus transmission also plays a critical role in preventing outbreaks from 
importations of WPV1 [27,38], which remain possible as long as WPV1 circulates anywhere 
and which can divert resources from, or delay, WPV1 eradication. Moreover, high 
population immunity to poliovirus transmission at the time of OPV13 cessation extends the 
time until populations become vulnerable to the transmission of OPV1- and OPV3-related 
viruses, including serotype 1 and 3 mOPV potentially introduced deliberately to respond to 
outbreaks.
The occurrence of relatively frequent cVDPV2s in the time period shortly before OPV2 
cessation came about as a direct result of national and programmatic decisions to use 
serotype 1 and 3 mOPV and bOPV for SIAs instead of tOPV. Based on the results of 
modeling that demonstrated the importance of increasing population immunity to serotype 2 
transmission in countries with poorly performing RI, national and global polio program 
managers intensified tOPV use in SIAs prior to OPV2 cessation which led to increased 
demand for tOPV [39,40], Ideally, following OPV2 cessation, countries will continue to use 
bOPV SIAs to maintain population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission between now 
and the time of OPV13 cessation, which will maintain vaccine demand, support ongoing and 
predictably high levels of bOPV production, and reduce or eliminate the need to intensify 
bOPV use prior to OPV13 cessation. Vaccine manufacturers will need to continue bOPV 
production in sufficient quantities to support global demands, including vaccine for outbreak 
response SIAs, until OPV13 cessation, and they will also need to also produce serotype 1 
and 3 mOPV for outbreak response vaccine stockpiles. This implies that maintaining 
ongoing support for vaccine purchase represents a critical risk management strategy. In 
contrast to the situation with OPV2 cessation, for which manufacturers switched from tOPV 
to bOPV production, after OPV13 cessation manufacturers will cease production of OPV 
altogether after filling the demand for mOPV to maintain a limited global stockpile for 
response to poliovirus outbreaks. This represents a fundamentally different change in the 
manufacturing market, with OPV production facilities decommissioned and/or repurposed 
after OPV13 cessation.
While the model suggests that countries at risk of cVDPVs after OPV13 cessation could 
largely cease bOPV SIAs and then pursue a strategy of bOPV intensification in the 6 months 
prior to OPV13 cessation to still prevent cVDPVs after OPV13 cessation, such a strategy 
comes with two significant potential unintended consequences. First, if these countries 
reduce the frequency of bOPV SIAs, then they increase their risk of outbreaks of imported 
WPV1 and/or cVDPVs prior to OPV13 cessation, which will lead to the need for expensive 
and unplanned outbreak response SIAs that also requires vaccine doses Countries at risk of 
cVDPVs will likely substantially reduce risks of serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus outbreaks if 
they continue to conduct at least one annual bOPV SIA, with the risk of outbreaks 
decreasing with increasing bOPV SIA frequency. Although this analysis showed that 
relatively low minimum routine immunization coverage is required to prevent indigenous 
cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks after OPV13 cessation (Figure 1), we emphasize that all 
communities need to maintain these levels and that, due to heterogeneity within countries, 
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maintaining national average population immunity to transmission at these thresholds will 
not always suffice to prevent indigenous cVDPVs. In this context, continuing to conduct 
bOPV SIAs will help maintain population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission in all 
communities and reduce cVDPV risks. Second, if countries cease bOPV SIAs, reduce their 
orders for bOPV, and contribute to global reductions in bOPV demand, then some 
manufacturers may leave the market early, which will reduce global production capacity. 
This may then lead to insufficient global bOPV production capacity to support bOPV 
intensification efforts that countries and the global program would want or need to conduct 
prior to OPV13 cessation. Insufficient population immunity prior to OPV13 cessation to 
prevent cVDPVs will ultimately increase the demand for outbreak response resources, 
including mOPV from the outbreak response stockpile, and lead to the need for increased 
production of OPV.
This analysis relied on a DEB model with previously discussed limitations related to 
uncertainty in model inputs and simplification of mixing assumptions for large populations 
[25]. While the generic model inputs (i.e., those that apply to all populations, like the OPV 
reversion time) represent the result of extensive expert input and model calibration that 
reproduced existing evidence [12,25,29,30], we cannot preclude that other combinations of 
model inputs might similarly or better approximate the uncertain real world values. This 
analysis also used simplified realistic populations to show the spectrum of possible 
outcomes and demonstrate the effect of changing population-specific assumptions. Real 
populations include more heterogeneity and more complicated poliovirus exposure and 
vaccination histories [29]. While the numerically optimal number of bOPV SIAs will vary 
between populations, we do not expect substantially different qualitative insights for other, 
real high-risk populations than those based on the simplified examples presented in this 
analysis. Our focus on cVDPV emergence defined as virus in the last reversion stage that 
transmits at the population level means that we did not consider occasional occurrence of 
viruses from healthy vaccine recipients or their contacts that meet the virological VDPV 
definition and represent the tail of the distribution of excreted viruses [41]. These events 
may occur even with sufficient bOPV SIAs but likely remain epidemiologically 
inconsequential. We also did not consider the implications of bOPV SIA choices on iVDPV 
and other long-term risks, considered elsewhere [17,34]. However, we believe that our 
choice of populations adequately approximates population immunity dynamics in real high-
risk settings. We hope that our analysis provides helpful context related to the management 
of serotype 1 and 3 population immunity to transmission until OPV13 cessation.
Conclusions
Although some reduction in global SIA frequency can safely occur, countries with 
suboptimal routine immunization coverage should each continue to conduct at least one 
annual SIA with bOPV, preferably more, until global OPV13 cessation. Preventing cVDPV 
risks after OPV13 cessation requires investments in bOPV SIAs now through the time of 
OPV13 cessation. Managing vaccine supply chain issues for bOPV until after bOPV13 
cessation remains a critical risk management issue.
Tebbens et al. Page 10














This publication was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 1U2RGH001913-01 funded by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the official views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Department of Health and 
Human Services.
Abbreviations
bOPV bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine
cVDPV(1,2,3) circulating VDPV (serotype 1, 2, or 3, respectively)
DEB differential-equation based
EIP* threshold effective immune proportion
EIPM age-and-sub-population-mixing-adjusted effective immune 
proportion
IPV inactivated poliovirus vaccine
iVDPV immunodeficiency-associated VDPV
mOPV monovalent oral poliovirus vaccine
OPV oral poliovirus vaccine
OPV## globally-coordinated cessation of OPV containing the 
serotypes indicated by ##
R0 basic reproduction number
RI routine immunization
Rn mixing-adjusted net reproduction number
SIA supplemental immunization activity
tOPV trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine
VDPV vaccine-derived poliovirus
WPV(1,2,3) wild poliovirus (serotype 1, 2, or 3, respectively)
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Population immunity to WPV1 and WPV3 transmission before and after OPV13 cessation 
for different routine immunization coverage with 3 non-birth bOPV doses (including IPV 
co-administration at third dose) in the hypothetical population with an R0 for WPV1 equal 
to 13*. Increasing population immunity reflects occurrence of an indigenous cVDPV 
outbreak. A) Lowest coverage that prevents both cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks. B) 
Highest coverage for which a cVDPV1 outbreak occurs (but no cVDPV3 outbreak). C) 
Lowest coverage that prevents a cVDPV3 outbreak (but which does not prevent a pre-
cessation cVDPV1 outbreak). D) Highest coverage for which both a cVDPV1 and a 
cVDPV3 outbreak occur. *R0 for WPV3=0.75 × R0 for WPV1 (i.e., 0.75 × 13=9.75)
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Minimum population immunity to transmission of each WPV serotype at tOPV or OPV13 
cessation to prevent a subsequent homotypic cVDPV outbreak in the hypothetical 
population with an R0 for WPV1 equal to 13*.*R0 for WPV2 = 0.9 × R0 for WPV1 (i.e., 0.9 
× 13=11.7) and R0 for WPV3=0.75 × R0 for WPV1 (i.e., 0.75 ×13=9.75)
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Population immunity to transmission as a function of the annual number of bOPV SIAs in 
the hypothetical population with a R0 for WPV1 equal to 13. A) Serotype 1. B) Serotype 3.
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Table 2
Impact of the annual number of bOPV SIAs on the persistence of OPV1- and OPV3-related polioviruses after 
OPV13 cessation in different populations.
Population with properties like
Annual Time (days since OPV13 cessation) until die-out of OPV-related virus
# bOPV SIAs Serotype 1 Serotype 3
Hypothetical (no seasonality), WPV1 R0 =13





Hypothetical (no seasonality), WPV1 R0 =10























Northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, under-vaccinated
0 Pre-cessation cVDPV Post-cessation cVDPV
1 Post-cessation cVDPV 260
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Population with properties like
Annual Time (days since OPV13 cessation) until die-out of OPV-related virus
# bOPV SIAs Serotype 1 Serotype 3
4 100 90
Northern Nigeria, under-vaccinated
0 Pre-cessation cVDPV 190
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